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[The Architectonic of Pure Reason] is of slight scientific 
importance, and is chiefly of interest for the light which it casts 
upon Kant’s personality. Moreover the distinctions which Kant 
here draws are for the most part not his own philosophical 
property, but are taken over from the Wolffian system. 
Norman Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant’s  
‘Critique of Pure Reason’ 579. 
 
Though a part of the Doctrine of Method, which follows the 
Transcendental Dialectic, the Architectonic is distinct from its broader 
context in the image of metaphysics it offers. Whereas the general tenor 
of the Dialectic is anti-metaphysical in the sense that throughout Kant is 
concerned to deny the claims of traditional metaphysics – by curbing the 
transcendent pretensions of reason – the Architectonic instead considers 
the positive possibility of metaphysics opened up by the critical results of 
the first half of the first Critique. 
Consider in this regard Kant’s concluding reflection in the History 
chapter: Kant’s “critical path [kritische Weg]” remains the sole path 
reason might follow to sate its “lust for knowledge [Wißbegierde]” 
(A855/B883); what Kant here envisions is a complete reason, i.e., a 
reason fully sated in its wanderlust. Despite the unfruitful efforts of 
“many centuries [viele Jahrhunderte]” of philosophy to bring reason to 
this point, Kant anticipates that a fulfilled reason might be realizable, 
“even before the end [noch vor Ablauf]” of the 18th century. The 
intimations of completeness in this closing remark recall the beginning of 
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the same paragraph: in offering his critical philosophy as the only 
alternative to dogmatism and skepticism, Kant still commends the latter 
for their attempt to be “scientific [szientifischen],” and “systematic 
[systematisch]” (A855/B883). 
This constellation of concepts – systematicity, science, and 
completeness – reappears at the head of the Architectonic chapter, now 
expressly linked to metaphysics. In its “widest sense [im weiten Sinn]” 
metaphysics is: 
[T]he system of pure reason (science), the whole (true as well as 
apparent) philosophical cognition from pure reason in systematic 
interconnection [das System der reinen Vernunft (Wissenschaft), die 
ganze (wahre sowohl als scheinbare) philosophische Erkenntnis aus 
reiner Vernunft im systematischen Zusammenhange] (A841/B869).
1
 
More overtly than in the History chapter, Kant here organizes the 
terminology of “systematicity,” “science,” and “completeness” under the 
heading of metaphysics: metaphysics, Kant explains, is a scientific 
“System der reinen Vernunft”; “systematicity,” Kant continues, consists 
in exhaustively “connecting together [zusammenhangen]” all 
philosophical cognition. An exhaustive interconnecting of philosophical 
cognition is then linked, in the definition, to completeness – to the “whole 
[ganze]” – of the metaphysical coordination of philosophical cognition. If 
we are to make sense of Kant’s understanding of a science of 
metaphysics in the context of his theoretical philosophy, completeness, 
systematicity, and the coordinated inter-connectedness of cognition must 
serve as guiding threads into this more embracing issue. 
                                                     
1
 There is, in Baumgarten’s Metaphysica, the idea of a “veritas metaphysica [true 
metaphysics]” as the “ordo plurium in uno [order of a plurality in a singularity]” 
(Baumgarten §89). Noteworthy of the Kantian notion of a metaphysics of “true 
[wahre]” philosophical cognition is, then, the way it locates the truth of the science 
of metaphysics in the truth of the cognition it systematically coordinates into a 
rational unity. We should also note that the Baumgartian use of “ordo” in reference 
to veritas metaphysica implies a general adherence to the idea that the elements of 
the science are already identified; the sole remaining task of metaphysics is to array 
such elements into their proper order. By using “ordo” rather than “methodus” to 
refer to the science of metaphysics, Baumgarten implicitly adopts the idea that 
science does not involve a productive – or “methodical” – aspect. Science in 
general, and the science of metaphysics in particular, is for Baumgarten a 
programmatic organization of an already identified manifold. Given Kant’s 
emphasis on methodus throughout the first Critique, and particularly in the closing 
chapters on the “Doctrine of Method,” there is an indication from the outset that his 
understanding of the scientificity of metaphysics is to be contrasted with the same 
in Baumgarten. 
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From the science of metaphysics generally defined, Kant proceeds in 
the Architectonic by dividing the science according to a scheme 
borrowed from Alexander Baumgarten’s Metaphysica (1739). 
Baumgarten’s procedure in the text is to begin each section with a 
definition of a particular branch of metaphysics, and then to detail that 
definition throughout the remainder of the section. The Cosmologia 
section, for instance, begins with the general definition, “Cosmologia 
generalis est scientia praedicatorum mundi generalium [general 
cosmology is the science of the general predicates of the world]”; 
Baumgarten then uses the concepts, “mundus,” “monadum,” and 
“corporum” to specify further this general definition (Baumgarten §351-
§430). A similar structure appears in the other main sections of 
Baumgarten’s text: Theologia and Psychologia are first generally defined, 
and then subsequently classified into the particularities of Theologia 
rationalis and Theologia naturalis, and Psychologia rationalis and 
Psychologia empirica, respectively. 
As with the three special metaphysical sciences of cosmology, 
theology, and psychology, so with the general metaphysics of ontology: 
Baumgarten begins with a general definition – “Ontologia est scientia 
praedicatorum entis generaliorum [ontology is the science of the general 
predicates of being]” (§4) – and then specifies it using the concepts of 
“possibile,” “connexium,” and “ens.”2 The scheme we find articulated 
through each particular branch of metaphysics is the micrological 
correlate of the macrological articulation of the whole of the science of 
metaphysics. The four-fold division of metaphysics into three special 
sciences and one general science, into, that is, cosmology, theology, and 
psychology on the one hand and ontology on the other, reproduces at the 
level of metaphysics generally the internal articulation of each particular 
division of the science. Accordingly, metaphysics in its most general 
form is defined in Baumgarten’s Prolegomena as, “scientia primorum in 
humana cognitione principiorum [science of the first principles of human 
cognition]” (§1); subsequently, Baumgarten divides this definition into its 
four main branches through the “first principles” of human cognition. 
                                                     
2
 In his Erläuterungen to the Metaphysica, Kant insists that the „realgrund der 
Wirklichkeit [real ground of actuality]” is „die Wirkende Ursache [the actual 
cause]” (R 3500); this in contrast to Baumgarten’s wholly logical construal of 
“ratio [ground]” (Baumgarten §14). Since the analysis of ratio serves Baumgarten 
to specify the more general ontological predicate of possible, it follows that while 
Kant retains the importance of “possibility [Möglichkeit]” as an aspect of ontology, 
he parts ways with the Wolffian metaphysical tradition as to how possibility, and 
thus how ontology in general, is to be specified. We will return to this point below. 
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In reviewing the general plan of Baumgarten’s Metaphysica, I have 
purposely highlighted its arboreal – its tree-like – layout. I.e., the specific 
branches of cosmology, psychology, theology, and ontology articulate 
the general science of metaphysics; each branch of the science branches 
further according to the specific concepts of possibility, being, intellect, 
etc. What this arboreal scheme suggests, in part, is the influence of 
Descartes on Baumgarten; the former, we recall, presents the relationship 
between metaphysics and the particular natural and physical sciences in 
the Principles of Philosophy as a root system securing the foundation of a 
tree-like trunk and upper arbor. Schulmetaphysik, which for Kant is 
exemplified in Baumgarten’s work, might be read accordingly as a 
collective effort to fill out the metaphysical root system whose seedbed 
Descartes provides in the “I think [cogito].” 
Generally, Kant in his writings and lectures on metaphysics adheres 
to the same arboreal scheme: he divides the general science of 
metaphysics into its particular cosmological, theological, and ontological 
branches. What is novel in Kant’s provisional appeal to this framework is 
the reversal he effects in the relationship between metaphysics and other 
claims of knowledge: it is the discursive conditions under which the tree 
and its branches grow that determine the extent of the underlying 
metaphysical root system. Note, in this regard, the following from the  
B-edition Preface: “Through this [critique] alone can we cut the very root 
of materialism, fatalism, atheism, of free thinking unbelief, of enthusiasm 
and superstition [Durch diese [Kritik] kann nun allein dem Materialism, 
Fatalism, Atheism, dem freigeisterischen Unglauben, der Schwämerei 
und Aberglauben [...] selbst die Wurzel abgeschnitten werden]” (Bxxxiv; 
translation modified). 
But, the arboreal scheme of Kant’s presentation of metaphysics is 
telling in another respect. It is by way of this scheme, I will argue, that 
Kant is able to realize in his theoretical plan for a scientific metaphysics 
what the tradition before him could not, namely, completeness and 
systematicity. Thus, it is significant that Kant’s presentation of 
metaphysics in the lecture courses, as well as his presentation of the same 
in the penultimate chapter of the first Critique, coincides with the form 
given the science in the Metaphysica: without this form, Kant could not 
realize completeness in a scientific metaphysics. 
In the Mrongovius notes (1782-1783), Kant begins his introductory 
overview of metaphysics with the general definition, “[metaphysics is] 
the science of the first principles of the entirety of human cognition” (Ak. 
29:749). This general definition is then specified through a discussion of 
the different modes of cognition, i.e., rational/philosophical and 
mathematical; through such specification, Kant is able to sketch in outline 
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the general metaphysical science of ontology. Continuing, Kant applies 
the same procedure in moving from a general account of each of the 
special sciences of metaphysics to their particular details according to 
their constituent concepts.3 The L2 notes (1790-1791) and the Vigilantius 
notes (1794-1795) follow the same structure: from defining metaphysics, 
generally, Kant proceeds in each set of lectures to divide metaphysics 
into its branches and sub-branches. 
While the form the lecture courses take might be explained simply 
by the format of the state-mandated source material, namely, 
Baumgarten’s Metaphysica, the same cannot be said of Kant’s procedure 
in the first Critique. As we have seen, Kant’s presentation of metaphysics 
in the Architectonic adheres to the form given the science by 
Baumgarten; in the chapter, Kant divides general metaphysics into its 
specific branches. Moreover, the first Critique as a whole follows the 
same form: it begins with the general metaphysical science of ontology 
and proceeds through the special metaphysics of rational psychology, 
cosmology and theology – all, of course, under different critical headings. 
It is this coincidence in form between Baumgarten’s Metaphysica and the 
first Critique – the latter free from the pedagogical constraints on Kant’s 
metaphysics lectures – that motivates the present inquiry into the 
Architectonic: the form of metaphysics as presented in its penultimate 
chapter is in this way treated as a synecdoche for the form of the text as a 
whole. 
 
*** 
 
Kant’s point of departure in the Architectonic is the above-cited 
general definition of metaphysics: “[T]he system of pure reason 
(science), the whole (true as well as apparent) philosophical cognition 
from pure reason in systematic interconnection.” Such a conception of 
metaphysics is “widest [weiten]” in including a propaedeutic 
transcendental critique as well as apparent philosophical cognition, i.e., 
the “transcendental illusion [transzendentalen Scheine]” (B352) 
presented in the Transcendental Dialectic. From metaphysics defined 
“wide[ly],” Kant proceeds by dividing the science into its particular 
branches. Kant’s “architectonic” method is, as noted above, delimiting 
rather than amplifying: the underlying roots of metaphysical cognition are 
                                                     
3
 The sequence of the Mrongovius lectures is: Introduction, Ontology, Cosmology, 
and Psychology. However, because of the peculiar standing of ontology relative to 
the science of metaphysics – a peculiarity considered below – we can, for now, 
simplify the general framework of metaphysics into an Introduction and subsequent 
considerations of the special metaphysical sciences. 
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pruned; warranted knowledge-claims are cut back so that a complete 
metaphysical system might grow from them. 
“Apparent philosophical cognition [scheinbare philosophische 
Erkenntnis]” and transcendental critique, the latter of which is 
unmentioned in Kant’s initial architectonic definition of metaphysics, are 
first cut away to reveal the two highest employments of reason: 
“[M]etaphysics is itself divided into the speculative and the practical use 
of pure reason [die Metaphysik teilt sich in die spekulativen und 
praktischen Gebrauchs der reinen Vernunft],” i.e., a metaphysics of 
nature and a metaphysics of morals (A841/B869; translation modified). 
Given Kant’s interest in the first Critique in speculative reason, little 
more is said in the text of the second of these two main divisions, namely, 
metaphysics as the science of the “practical use of pure reason.” Instead, 
Kant remains with theoretical reason, and describes a metaphysics of 
nature as focused on “everything insofar as it is [alles, so fern es ist]” 
rather than on what “ought to be [was sein soll]” (A845/B873). 
Metaphysics “in its narrowest sense [im engeren Verstande],” i.e., in the 
narrow sense of reason in its employment relative to everything that is, is 
then divided between transcendental philosophy and a physiology of pure 
reason. 
Metaphysics “narrowly understood [im engeren Verstande]” as a 
transcendental philosophy is concerned with the understanding and with 
reason as the “system of all concepts and principles that are related to 
objects in general [System aller Begriffe und Grundsätze, die sich auf 
Gegenstände überhaupt beziehen].” The other branch of metaphysics in 
the narrow sense, Kant continues, is a “physiology of pure reason [der 
Physiologie der reinen Vernunft],” which “considers nature, i.e., the sum 
total of given objects [betrachtet Natur, d.i. den Inbegriff gegebener 
Gegenstände].” The domain of a physiology of pure reason is delimited 
according to “the use of reason in [its] rational consideration of nature 
[der Gebrauch der Vernunft in dieser rationalen Naturbetrachtung]” 
(A845/B873). 
Once more, Kant sets aside for consideration elsewhere a particular 
division of metaphysics. Kant offers a metaphysical physiology of 
reason; he does so, though, outside of the context of the first Critique in 
the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (1786). Given this 
textual division of labor, I will note only that Kant organizes a physiology 
of pure reason around the same focus as he does a transcendental 
philosophy, namely, the possibility of objectivity in general. This focus 
on general objectivity is prompted by Kant’s translation of traditional 
ontological predicates into rules of discursive thought. Within the 
framework of traditional metaphysics, this translation converts general 
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ontology into an analytic of the understanding – a transformation of 
metaphysical ontology that Kant first announces in the Phenomena and 
Noumena chapter of the Analytic of Principles. 
The Transcendental Analytic, Kant here explains, accomplishes the 
“important result [wichtige Resultat]” of showing the understanding a 
priori to be able to accomplish nothing more than anticipate the “form of 
a possible experience in general [die Form einer möglichen Erfahrung 
überhaupt].” The understanding, bound to the “limits of sensibility [die 
Schranken der Sinnlichkeit]” in operating only under the conditions of 
objectivity provided by sensibility, is the principled “exposition of 
appearances [der Exposition der Erscheinungen].” From this, Kant 
concludes: 
[T]he proud name of ontology, which presumes to offer synthetic a 
priori cognitions of things in general in a systematic doctrine [...] must 
give way to the modest one of a mere analytic of the pure 
understanding [[D]er stolze Name einer Ontologie, welche sich 
anmaßt, von Dingen überhaupt synthetische Erkenntnisse a priori in 
einer systematischen Doktrin zu geben [...] muß dem bescheidenen, 
einer bloßen Analytik des reinen Verstandes, Platz machen]. 
(A247/B303) 
Ontology as a metaphysics of the predicates of things as they are in 
themselves, must give way to an analytic of the possibility of objectivity 
in general – and, this if metaphysics is to attain scientific completeness. 
As Kant presents it in the initial chapters of the first Critique, an 
analytic of the understanding is a principled exposition of the 
transcendental conditions of the possibility of experience. Further, in the 
Transcendental Deduction Kant argues that the conditions of the 
possibility of experience are the conditions of the possibility of the 
objects of experience (Cf. B161). The significance of these analytic 
findings for traditional metaphysics, and particularly the significance of 
the objective validity of the categories for such a science, is what remains 
to be shown in the second half of the first Critique. 
Consider, once more, Baumgarten’s general definition of 
metaphysics: “scientia primorum in humana cognitione principiorum 
[science of the first principles of human cognition].” In the Metaphysik 
Mrongovius, Kant reproduces Baumgarten’s definition with one 
noteworthy addition: metaphysics is “the science of the first principles of 
the entirety of human cognition” (Ak. 29:749; emphasis added). Where 
Baumgarten refers to the principles of human cognition in general, Kant 
insists that such principles be exhaustive of human cognition. 
Accordingly, Kant charges Baumgarten with overlooking the key 
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metaphysical issue of completeness: “But this concept [of metaphysics] is 
not determinate enough as to how much or how little belongs to it. For if 
I give a concept of science, then it must be determined what belongs to it 
and what not” (Ak. 29:749). 
The Baumgartian definition of metaphysics with which Kant 
inaugurates the Mrongovius lectures is found lacking because to define a 
science one must both measure its full scope as well as identify all that 
falls within its purview. Metaphysics as Baumgarten conceives it is 
lacking in completeness because its principles do not allow reason to 
exercise itself speculatively; or, what is the same, the principles of 
traditional metaphysics do not bound the pure activity of reason to a 
determinate field. In Kantian terms, the principles of a complete 
metaphysics, which Baumgarten lacks, are those provided by ontology 
once it is remade as an analytic of the understanding. Kant intimates this 
point in the Mrongovius lectures by moving from the traditional 
definition of metaphysics through his complaint of its incompleteness to a 
discussion of an analytic of the understanding as the means to “acquaint 
myself with [reason’s] whole faculty, and its sources, and become 
acquainted with how far they reach, and their boundaries” (Ak. 29:752; 
emphasis added). 
The principles that enable Kant’s success where the metaphysical 
tradition before him failed are the transcendental conditions of 
experienceable objects, i.e., the spatio-temporal form of human 
sensibility; the determinants of objects as appearances; and, most 
fundamentally, the transcendental unity of apperception as the principle 
of objectivity in general. As this last transcendental aspect of experience 
suggests, crucial to Kant’s broader metaphysical success is the critical 
turn from the cognition of “the nature of things [die Natur der Dinge]” to 
the understanding as cognition “about the nature of things [über die Natur 
der Dinge]” (A12-13/B26). Objectivity is still of central moment in 
Kant’s transcendentalized ontology; but, it is “objectivity in general” – 
„Gegenständlichkeit überhaupt” – rather than objects per se. What this 
means it that regardless of the particularities of the empirical manifold, 
the conditions that determine sensible givens as objects are fully 
articulable from a transcendental perspective. 
It is in this sense that Kant’s critical reworking of an ontology into 
an analytic of the understanding enables him to realize what Baumgarten 
before him failed to attain. Baumgarten’s metaphysics is incomplete – 
and, necessarily so – because it is grounded in an ontology of things in 
themselves: the conditions of objects per se can never be fully catalogued 
because of the manifold determinants of such objects. Rather, only the 
conditions of cognition “about [über]” things, as Kant puts it, can be 
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completely catalogued. Such a complete catalogue is what Kant claims to 
have secured in the table of categories as the conditions of objectivity in 
general insofar as they are metaphysically deduced from the complete list 
of the logical function of the understanding in judgment (A67/B92) – 
leaving aside, in the present context, questions of the viability of Kant’s 
claims to completeness in reference to the categories. 
Completeness, which is one of the hallmarks of Kant’s architectonic 
definition of the science of metaphysics, is thus secured by Kant’s 
transcendentalization of Baumgarten’s objective ontology: where the 
latter is incomplete because of the manifold empirical determinants of 
objects per se, the former is complete in the metaphysical derivation of 
the conditions of objectivity in general from the logical functions of the 
understanding in judgment. The other features of Kant’s architectonic 
metaphysics – systematicity, and the complete inter-connectedness of 
cognition – are realized through the same insight; showing the link 
between completeness through transcendental objectivity in general, and 
systematicity and thoroughgoing interconnectedness of cognition is the 
task of the remainder of my paper. Kant provides the key to this 
connection in the notion of an “idea [Idee]” – a concept Kant discusses in 
the Architectonic in the process of refocusing the particular sciences of 
Baumgarten’s metaphysics onto objectivity in general. 
 
*** 
 
Having divided metaphysics in its narrow sense between a 
transcendental philosophy and a physiology of pure reason, Kant 
continues in the Architectonic chapter of the first Critique by dividing the 
latter according to whether the use of reason “pertains to nature so far as 
its cognition can be applied in experience (in concreto),” or, to “that 
connection of the objects of experience [Verknüpfung der Gegenstände 
der Erfahrung] which surpasses all experience” (A845/B873). The 
former Kant calls the “physical [physisch]” or “immanent” use of reason; 
the latter Kant calls the “hyperphysical [hyperphysisch]” or 
“transcendent” use of reason. Next, employing a distinction familiar from 
the Amphiboly chapter of the text of whether a representation has an 
“inner [innere]” or “outer [äußere]” relation to its object (A261/B317), 
Kant identifies a transcendent physiology of pure reason with an inner 
relation to its object, and calls this “the transcendental cognition of the 
world [die transzendentale Welterkenntnis].” Correspondingly, a 
transcendent physiology with an outer relation to its object is classified 
as “the transcendental cognition of God [die transzendentale 
Gotteserkenntnis]” (A846/B874). The other branch of a physiology of 
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pure reason, the physical or immanent form of such a physiology, is 
followed out in like manner: rational psychology is the immanent 
physiology of reason with an inner relation to its object; rational physics 
is the immanent physiology of reason with an outer relation to its object 
(A846/B874). 
Though implicit throughout this discussion of metaphysics, Kant 
next turns explicitly to the four-fold classificatory scheme of Baumgarten 
in the Metaphysica. The scheme into which Baumgarten divides the 
science of metaphysics is in the Architectonic transformed through the 
lens of objectivity in general, which Kant provides in his analytic of the 
understanding. Note, in this regard, the central place objectivity occupies 
in each of Kant’s reconfigurations of the particular sciences of 
metaphysics. Baumgarten’s definition of rational cosmology as the, 
“scientia praedicatorum mundi generalium [science of the predicates of 
the world in general]” (Baumgarten §351)4 becomes in the Architectonic 
the pure activity of thinking as a physiology of pure reason with an outer 
relation to its object. The metaphysica specialis of rational psychology, 
which for Baumgarten is the “scientia praedicatorum animae generalium 
[science of the predicates of the soul in general]” (§501), is likewise 
framed in terms of objectivity in general. What is for Baumgarten “the 
cognition of the objects of inner sense insofar as it is obtained from 
experience” (Ak. 28:222), is for Kant an immanent physiology of pure 
reason whose object is that of inner sense, i.e., “thinking nature” 
(A846/B874). 
Restated as it is through the topic of objectivity in general, Kant is 
able to present Baumgarten’s traditional map of the four-branched 
science of metaphysics under the designation of “complete 
systematicity”: “[T]he entire system of metaphysics consists of four main 
parts. 1. Ontology. 2. Rational Physiology. 3. Rational Cosmology. 4. 
Rational Theology [besteht das ganze System der Metaphysik aus vier 
Hauptteilen. 1. Der Ontologie. 2. Der rationalen Physiologie. 3. Der 
rationalen Kosmologie. 4. Der rationalen Theologie]” (A846/B874; 
emphasis added). Moreover, and here is the point at which the 
completeness through an analytic of the understanding meets systematic 
interconnectedness through an architectonic of pure reason, the four-fold 
classificatory scheme of metaphysics follows from “[t]he original idea of 
a philosophy of pure reason [Die ursprüngliche Idee einer Philosophie 
der reinen Vernunft]” (A847/B875; emphasis added). In order to trace 
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 In the Metaphysik Mrongovius Kant rephrases Baumgarten’s definition of rational 
cosmology as follows: “The concept of a world in general determined through 
limitation of the sensible world by reason” (Ak. 29:848). 
 The traditional form of a complete science 159 
the link between analytic completeness and rational systematic 
interconnectedness through an idea, we must consider, briefly, Kant’s 
logical presentation of an idea in the second and third sections of the first 
book of the Dialectic. 
Here, Kant explains that just as discursive thought in judgment 
brings forth “categories that direct all use of the understanding in 
experience [welche allen Verstandesgebrauch in der Erfahrung leiten],” 
so reason in operating syllogistically brings forth various transcendental 
ideas, which “determine the use of the understanding according to 
principle in the whole of an entire experience [den Verstandesgebrauch 
im Ganzen der gesamten Erfahrung nach Prinzipien bestimmen werden]” 
(A321/B378).5 
In a “rational syllogism [Vernunftschluß]” the major premise is a 
“rule (major),” which is thought “through the understanding [eine Regel 
(major) durch den Verstand].” Continuing, Kant explains that through the 
power of judgment [Urteilskraft] the cognition is “subsume[d] 
[subsumiere]” under the “condition of the rule (minor) [die Bedingung 
der Regel (minor)].” This two-step discursive operation is then followed 
by inference, properly speaking: “Finally, I determine my cognition 
through the predicate of the rule (conclusio), hence a priori through 
reason [Endlich bestimme ich mein Erkenntnis durch das Prädikat der 
Regel (conclusio), mithin a priori durch die Vernunft]” (A304/B360-
361). 
From the forms of rational syllogism, Kant turns to a topic of greater 
import for a metaphysics of reason, namely, reason in its “pure use 
[reinen Gebrauche].” The latter is the logical, syllogistic functioning of 
reason – and this is key – under the assumption of the givenness of the 
conditions of objectivity in general in the major premise as a rule of the 
understanding (A307-308/B364). Such “pure use” of reason under the 
conditions of the understanding given in the major premise is the source 
of the dialectical illusions into which reason falls; these are the illusions 
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 Kant uses the “proposition [Satz],” “Caius is mortal [Cajus ist sterblich],” to 
exemplify the categorical form of rational syllogism. 
 I seek a concept containing the condition under which the predicate (the assertion in 
general) of this judgment is given (i.e., here, the concept “human”); and, after I 
have subsumed [the predicate] under this condition, taken in its whole domain (“all 
humans are mortal”), I determine the cognition of my object according to it (“Caius 
is mortal”) [Allein ich suche einen Begriff, der die Bedingung enthält, unter welcher 
das Prädikat (Assertion überhaupt) diese Urteils gegeben wird, (d.i. hier, den 
Begriff des Menschen); und nachdem ich unter diese Bedingung, in ihrem ganzen 
Umfange genommen, (alle Menschen sind sterblich) subsumiert habe: so bestimme 
ich darnach die Erkenntnis meines Gegenstandes (Cajus ist sterblich)]. 
(A322/B378) 
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that Kant corrects in the Dialectic under the headings of the 
“paralogisms,” “antinomies,” and “ideal” of reason. Further, reason 
cannot help but succumb to these dialectical pitfalls (A297/B353), for in 
its pure use it functions according to the discursive rules of objectivity; 
without critical correction, reason thus cannot help but assume that the 
ideas it concludes through its syllogistic inferences have objective 
significance. 
Given my interest in the positive possibility of a science of 
metaphysics outlined in the Architectonic, I leave aside Kant’s critical 
solutions to the problems of the Antinomies, Paralogisms, etc.; that is, I 
leave aside Kant’s negative critique of traditional metaphysics. Rather, I 
am interested in a pure use of reason which remains determinate in 
operating under the discursive conditions of objectivity in general in its 
major premise, but which avoids the illusory thought that its conclusions 
have actual objective significance. Such a use of reason would, according 
to Kant in the first book of the Dialectic, establish a “thoroughgoing 
interconnection [durchgängigen Zusammenhang]” within reason’s 
manifold cognition (A305/B362); in the Architectonic, Kant makes the 
same point: when operating according to an idea, reason accomplishes a 
coordinated and systematic “articulation [gegliedert]” of its cognition 
(A833/B861). The idea in question, here, is the principle that reason seek 
the “unconditioned [Unbedingte]” for every “conditioned cognition 
[bedingten Erkenntnisse]” (A307/B364); or, more simply, it is the idea of 
the pure systematic use of reason as the architectonic “rational concept of 
the form of the whole [der Vernunftbegriff von der Form eines Ganzen]” 
(A832/B860). 
The “rational concept of the form of the whole” is the idea of reason 
itself in accordance with its highest “ends [Zwecke]” – “ends,” which 
Kant presents in the ethical, political, and religious works of the critical 
project. Thus, we seem to reach an impasse in our efforts to describe a 
complete and systematic science of metaphysics within the context of 
speculative reason alone. While an account of the completeness of a 
science of metaphysics is secured through the provision of the conditions 
of objectivity in general to reason in the major premise of its inferences, a 
similar account of the systematic interconnectedness of the cognition that 
results from such inferences is determinate only in reference to “ends” 
that stand outside of the domain of speculative reason. Thus, the pure – 
or, real – use of reason in the first Critique is merely regulative, and the 
science of metaphysics on offer in the text is complete but not 
determinately systematic. 
What we overlook in reaching this conclusion is how Kant’s 
architectonic idea of the “transcendental concept of the form of the 
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whole” compares to Baumgarten’s formal presentation of metaphysics in 
his Metaphysica: How, in short, does an architectonic idea of the pure use 
of reason relate to the arboreal scheme that figures prominently in the 
form of the Architectonic? Consider, in this regard, the following 
description of “the form of the whole,” which Kant explains is 
systematically “articulated (articulatio)” rather than merely being 
“heaped together (coacervatio).” 
[The whole] can, to be sure, grow internally (per intus susceptionem) 
but not externally (per appositionem), like an animal body, whose 
growth does not add a limb but rather makes each limb stronger and 
fitted for its end [[Das Ganze] kann zwar innerlich (per intus 
susceptionem), aber nicht äußerlich (per appositionem) wachsen, wie 
ein tierischer Körper, dessen Wachstum kein Glied hinzusetzt, 
sondern, ohne Veränderung der Proportion, ein jedes zu seinen 
Zwecken stärker und tüchtiger macht]. (A833/B861) 
Though here cast in terms of the body of an animal, Kant’s 
description of the form of the whole accords with how he would have us 
conceive the “tree” of metaphysics: the root system of such a tree is 
curtailed from above through excision of its non-viable limbs and 
branches. Kant, in fact, makes just this comparison a page later. The 
architectonic articulation of all metaphysical cognition “begins only at the 
point where the general root of our cognitive power divides and branches 
out into two stems [fangen nur von dem Punkte an, wo sich die 
allgemeine Wurzel unserer Erkenntniskraft teilt und zwei Stämme 
auswirft]” (A835/B863). 
Significantly, Kant describes in overtly organic terms the pure use of 
reason in accordance with the architectonic idea of the form of the whole; 
this description immediately precedes Kant’s presentation of the four-fold 
classificatory scheme of the science of metaphysics. From the arboreal 
scheme of the pure use of reason according to the idea of the form of the 
whole at the beginning of the Architectonic, Kant, several Akademie 
pages later, reproduces Baumgarten’s traditional science of metaphysics: 
the science in general is divided between its four main branches of 
natural theology, rational psychology, and rational cosmology (A846-
847/B874-875). 
What, though, do these special metaphysical sciences present if not 
the “ends” of reason? Natural theology presents the idea of the existence 
of God; rational psychology, in turn, covers the existence and nature of 
the human soul; finally, rational cosmology countenances the origin and 
nature of the universe. Thus, in Baumgarten’s scheme for the science of 
metaphysics, which is grafted intact into the middle of Kant’s 
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Architectonic, the highest ends of reason appear in a wholly theoretical 
context. Reason can think these “ends” in determinate fashion under the 
rule of objectivity in general supplied by the understanding in the major 
premise of its real syllogistic use without falling into error about their 
actual objective significance – after all, the rule given in the major 
premise is (merely) the rule for objectivity in general; and, it can 
systematically interconnect this cognition according to the architectonic 
idea of the “transcendental form of the whole.” 
Kant has assured this last critical correction of reason’s pure 
speculative use by making over traditional ontology, which considers 
objects as they are in themselves, into an analytic of the understanding, 
which offers only the conditions of objectivity in general. Thus, when 
reason thinks through Baumgarten’s science of theology, for example, it 
is able to do so in the form of a science as a whole without thereby 
treating the idea of “God” as corresponding to a determinate object. To 
the extent that speculative reason thinks the idea of God, it does so in 
terms of objectivity in general, i.e., as a constituent part of the whole of 
theology as a special metaphysical science. By applying the same 
architectonic idea to each of the special metaphysical sciences of the 
rationalist tradition, reason grasps the whole of the science of 
metaphysics in outline, i.e., in complete and systematically 
interconnected form. 
Herein lies the significance of Kant’s continued adherence to the 
traditional metaphysical scheme of the science of metaphysics in a text 
where such an account is no longer in force. It is by way of the traditional 
metaphysical framework provided in Baumgarten’s Metaphysica, and, 
more specifically, in the delimited four-fold branch system of the science 
of metaphysics, that Kant provides reason the “objects” of its pure 
architectonic use. Like Baumgarten before him, Kant privileges ontology 
as the sole general metaphysical science. Kant takes advantage of the 
traditional privilege afforded ontology in order to recast it as an analytic 
of the understanding through which reason in its pure speculative use is 
provided the conditions of objectivity in general. By such conditions, 
recast late in Kant’s text as the principle of the architectonic idea of the 
form of the whole, reason is able to think metaphysics in complete and 
systematic form. Thus, speculative reason is provided the plan by which 
it can accomplish in Kant what Baumgarten failed to provide – and this 
by means of Baumgarten’s own scheme – namely, a complete and 
systematic science of metaphysics. 
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ABSTRACT 
The article treats as significant the formal coincidence between Kant’s 
presentation of the science of metaphysics in the “Architectonic of Pure Reason” 
chapter of the first Critique and Alexander Baumgarten’s presentation of the 
same in the Metaphysica. From his comments on Baumgarten in the metaphysics 
lectures, the article shows that for Kant metaphysics in its traditional form lacked 
completeness and systematic order. Kant fits completeness into his architectonic 
plan of a scientific metaphysics by converting Baumgartian ontology into an 
“analytic of the understanding”; Kant achieves the systematicity by modeling a 
rational “idea of the form of the whole” after Baumgarten’s tree-like ordering of 
the special sciences of metaphysics. Thus, Kant realizes the completeness and 
systematicity in a theoretical presentation of the science of metaphysics that he 
164 Adrian Switzer 
finds lacking in Baumgarten precisely by borrowing from the latter his scheme 
for metaphysics. 
Keywords: metaphysics, architectonic, completeness, systematicity, ontology 
RESUMO 
Este artigo considera significante a coincidência formal entre a 
apresentação kantiana da ciência da metafísica no capítulo da “Arquitectónica da 
Razão Pura” da primeira Crítica e a apresentação da mesma feita por Alexander 
Baumgarten na Metaphysica. A partir dos seus comentários sobre Baumgarten 
nas conferências sobre metafísica, o artigo mostra que, para Kant, falta 
completude e ordem sistemática à metafísica na sua forma tradicional. Kant 
encaixa a completude no seu plano arquitectónico de uma metafísica científica 
convertendo a ontologia baumgarteniana numa “analítica do entendimento”; 
Kant alcança a sistematicidade modelando uma racional “ideia da forma do 
todo” após a ordenação arborescente feita por Baumgarten a propósito das 
ciências especiais da metafísica. Assim, Kant concretiza a completude e a 
sistematicidade numa apresentação teórica da ciência da metafísica que 
considera faltar em Baumgarten, precisamente ao adaptar deste último o seu 
esquema para a metafísica. 
Palavras-chave: metafísica, arquitectónica, completude, sistematicidade, 
ontologia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
